HSERVEHS widely believe tluat the decline inn tine doliar-'s value agairusf foreign cum-renncies, winicin began inn 1935, inas hoosfed US, manuufacfun-irig output significannfh'. 'line dollar's declinue was expected to 1-aise tine dollar pm-ices of U.S. innnpor-fs winile inn~'em-inngthe fon-eigmn-curn-emncv pr-ices of f/S. expom-ts; inn n-espornse, fhe quantify dennnannded of both t~I5. expom-fs annd innpot't-cornrpetitng goods would rise, This demnnamnd-based iimnkage has been cenifn-al to amnalvses of [noUn fine imufer-muational and donnnesfic en:onnomic pr-ospects nnf tluis nnationu sinuce e.an-iv inn finis decade. The emnnplnasis omn ann imu\'er-se r-elationnship betweenn [1,5, nnut put annd tine value of the dollar-becannne pI-eennnimnennf fr-onnn 19Sf) to eat-I 1985, winenu tine doiiat-'s value rose drannnaticaiiv amnd winein a lnistorncallv far-ge fm-ade deficit emerged.
ciafed witin the growitng fn-ade deficit dun-inng fine pemiod of the n-ising dollar also exinihifed den:hnning output and, itn furnn, winetiner their output has beern boosted by fine genuen-ai dechn'ue inn fine clollam's value sinuce then. THE EXCHANGE RATE, PRODUCTION AND TRADE 'l'ine dollar's value rose shan-ply fromnn 1980 fn 1985 and subsequenntiv declined; char-f 1 shows this nnovennnennf for mnneasures of hotin the mnontninnai anud n-cal exchange value of fine dollar. Tine n-cal cxn:lnange n-afe is fine nnonmumual excinannge n-ate (El nunultiphed by fine ratio of fine U.S. price level (P 1~l fn tine for-eignn pt-ice level IPl.z This n-ate differs fn-omnn flue nonnuirnal exn:iuannge n-ate inn that it excludes rnnovennuennfs tiuat an-c attn-ihn,ntahie to clnannges imn donunestic pn-in:e levels like P 1 or P~.For exam pie, suppose thuat U.S. prices rise X percernf while prices abroad are unnchannged. The nonnnirnai exchnannge value of fine doliat would inave to fail X pen-cent fnu-fine ciollam' prices of both U.S. arnd foreignn goods to muse in' X pen-cent annd for-tine fon-eigru pm-ices nf botin U.S. annd for-nrignn goods to be uncinannged. %'~'inenprice levels and exchamuge rates cinannge for sucin pun'el~' nnonefarv neasonns, tine meal excharnge n-ate amnci decisions about productionu, n:onnsunnpfiorn amud trade an-c unnaffected. Bothu nnneasures itn chan-t 1 rose sharply fiunnu 1980 to 1985, tlnenn dechnned rougbiiv as mun:h as they mad risenn, bnowever. rEefer-ences to exchange n-ate cinannges below ar-c to bofin nnonnimnal annd n-cal chanuges unless irndicated oil nerwise .1
The Conventional Analysis a/the hi//jècts of an Exchange Rate Change
A connvenfional amnaiysis nnf tine effecfs of a n:inarnge inn the dollar's value on donnnestic pm'odun:-fiomn amnd tr-ade is sinowrn inn ligune 1. Tine supply curve 15 sinows that the domestic quantity supplied of producf IX) will incr-ease if the domestic pm-ice of the product rises, given the other factors influemncinng the position of the curve. Tine dennand ctnmve liii indicates the quantity demanded donnesticafly at vamuous domestic pn-ices, givenu fine ofinen factor-s that influence its position. Tine world pr-ice IP,1 and the domestic pm-ice ane equal when nneasun-ed in doilams pen innif of the producf; the wonid pm-ice equals the pm-ice in a foreign counufty' mnneasumed in its cur-n-cnn' units (~*( divided by tine foreigin cumrency pm-ice of the dollar (El. Tine differennce between the quantifies supplied amnd dennannled donnesfically is fine quantity either-cxported (when tine quantity supplied exceeds tinat dennandedl or innported Iwinenn tine quanntitv dennnanded exceeds that supphedl. As dn-awin inn figur-e 1, the U.S. exports product X at the initial pnnn:e P, If the vaiue of the dnuliar (El rises and the fon-eign price of the good remains the same, the world price expressed in dollars IP*/E) is reduced; in figure 1, the price faHs to Pa.. As a result, the domestic quantity supplied would fail and the donuestic quantity demanded wnnuid rise, reducing the qtnantity of X exported. For an import enl good, the analysis is the same: when the dollar price falls, U.S. cornsumption rises, U.S. production falls and the difference -the quantity importedincm-eases. Conversely, a fall in the value of tine dollar is expected to n-aise the dollar pr-ices of goods that are traded inten-nationally, providing an incentive to raise domestic production and n-educe donnestic pun-chases; in this case, the quantity of tn-aded goods expor-ted will nise and tine quanutity imported will fafi.
Fronn the foneignn perspective, the frgun-e and r-esults ar-c the n-ever-se. Thus, when the value of the doilan-n-ises, the won-id pm-ice measured in foneign cum-renucy rises, inducing foreigners to produce nnnore traded goods but consume less of theun. Thus, a rise in the value of the dollar-is expected to r-edistn-ibute the productionn of internationally traded goods from tine United States to fon-eign pm-oducers. Conversely, when the value nuf the dolian' fails, the U.S. output of these goods is boosted, while fon'eign output declines.
An Alternative He;v of Recent Exchange Rate Movements
While there is nnothing inherennt!v wrong with the conventionai analysis abnuve, its n-elevance to observed exchange rate movements is questionable. In the anaiysis in figure 1, the change in the value of the dollar is "exogenous," or external to the donnestic factors tinat influence the supply and demand cunves. The doflar-'s vaiue, however-, is determined in currency mamkets in which the dennand for-dollar-s in for-eign exchange is nuotivated by factor-s influencing foreign demand for' U.S. expor-ts and assets, while the supply of dollar-s in foreign exchange is motivated by U.S. decisions to purciuase foreign goods or assets-if channges irn rnucentiyes in asset mamkets raise Iiowerl the relatiye attn-actiyenuess of investment in the United States arid m-aise liowerl the exter-nnal value of tine dolian-, the exchange n-ate change can only be exogenous to a U.S. rnnarket fom-a good if the domestic supply and demand for-tinat product at-c unaffected.' A shift inn tine relative attn-activeness of U.S. vs. fon-eign irnvestmernt tinat din-ectly affects asset man--kets but not goods man-kets is impossible. After all, tine opportunnitv cost of employing capital in pm-oductiorn is infiuennced by expected nates of r'eturn botin at inonnne annd abn-oad. Tine typical r-ationnaie for 'Factors reflecting overall price levels both in the United States and abroad are held constant in figure I . A given supply curve for X assumes that the dollar factor cost of resources used to produce product X are fixed, suggesting that the U.S. general level of prices is held constant; the local currency price of the product abroad also is held constant, suggesting that the price level abroad is unchanged. Thus, the change in the external value of the dollar represents a "real" exchange rate change.
Quantity per
Period ignoring these n-elated effects inn the goods munar-ket is that, inn the shor't n-un at least, channges in the capital stock (plant and equipment) are smali nelative to tine existimng stock of sucin goods. 'linus, the shon-t-n'un output and pn-oductivity effects ar-c also pnesnnmed to be relatively small. This sinnplification is most questionable when the very pun-pose of policy actions tinat give rise to sucin a smut in investment imncemntives is to raise productivity arnd outptnt.
tn the eamiv 1980s, the meal rate of retur-n nun investrnnent inn tine tinited States was n-aised by tax policy actionns, especially those that extended tine irnvestrnnent tax credit annd acceierated depr'eciatiorn allowances, tn effect, tinese changes lower-ed the cost of capital to U.S. firms and n-aised tine r-eai rates of return tinat these firnns were wiilimng to hid to maintain and acquire new equity and debt financing. While tax changes pn-ovided a positive incentiye for-firrnns to expand capacity and output domestically, the higher-rates of r-ettnt-n generally discouraged output and innvestntrennt in activities without these new tax breaks, especially such activities abroad.' Pnoponents of the conventiornai view desctibed above neglect these tax-policy-induced cinanges; indeed, they focus oruly on the supposed budgetdeficit -dr-ivenn r-ise in (real) interest m-ates and its consequent effects on investnnent and the value of the dollar. From an altemrnative supply-side view, however-, tine rise in tine dollar's value was produced by tine sanne policy actions that also pr-oduced ann irncrease in tine supply of donnestic output.' Similarly, econornuic policy n:hannges tinat never-se inuvestrnnent irncenntives amid Inave adverse output supply effects will botin icnwer tine value of tine dollar annd redun:e the supply of donnnestic output. Frnnnnn the outset of tine discussiorn of tax refor'rnn inn late 1985, it was clear that ear-lien-inucenutives to invest, notably tine irnvestrmnernt tax cm-edit )iTCJ arnd accelerated depreciation for-str-uctures, would soorn end. Tinese cinarnges wer-e irucon-pon-ated imn tine Tax Refon-nu Act of 1986 land nnnade r-etn-oactive to tine tneginmning of 1986 inn tine case of tine I'l'Ci. inn respornse, domestic innvestrnent plunnnneted fnonrn iate-198,5 to mid-I 987." Tinese tax chamuges sinouid be expected to reduce both tine supply of domnnestic outpint arid tine exchange n-ate. ' 
Output and The Exchange .Rate Winen Dovnesth.~Supp~iy Shifts-
Figur-e 2 shows a shift in tine domestic supply of product X from S to 5'; such a shift can arise because of a reduction in factor-costs. For lam-ge countries like the United States, tine increase irn donnnestic supply will have an appm-eciabie effect on tine won-id supply as well: the pm-ice nnf product X will fall as donnestic output IX,I and total wom'lnl output rise.
4 The hypothesis described is elaborated more fully in Tatom (1985) and (i986a). This hypothesis is not widely endorsed. Recent papers by Mutti and Grubert (1988) and , especially, Sinn (1988) address the influence of tax policy changes on international capital and trade flows and the value of the dollar; see also the comments by Graverie (1988) and Patrick (1988) . Ott (1984) and Fazzari (1987) also describe the 1981 and 1986 tax law changes for capital income and their effects. Ohmae (1988) argues that the link between the vaiue of the dollar and U.S. competitiveness has been the opposite of that typically put forward in the popular and academic press. 805km and Gale (1986) provide evidence on firm mobility that is consistent with Ohmae's view. Poole (1988) indicates that the 1981 tax act was the primary real disturbance in this decade and that it raised the real after-tax rate of return on investment. He also indicates the minority status of this view, however. Stockman and Svensson (1987) provide a format model in which changes in wealth and its distribution can give rise to capital flows, current account movements and exchange rate changes that simultaneously match those described here. 5 Krugman and Baldwin (1987) emphasize the importance of relative productivity developments as the factor accounting for the dollar's decline and the growth in the trade deficit after early 1985, but do not address the possible connections of the exchange rate, trade and relative productivity developments in the 1980-85 period. corporate income (taxed at 51 percent) realized through retained earnings and capital gains (taxed at 20 percent) to 59,1 percent in 1988 for corporate income (taxed at 39 percent) realized through capital gains or dividend income (taxed at 33 percent). This 1988 tax rate change excludes the end of the ITO and reductions in service lives for depreciation that further raised effective marginal tax rates, but includes a 5 percentage-point surcharge for individuals and corporations that phases out at sufficiently high incomes.
From 1985 to 1987, corporate tax accruals (excluding the Federal Reserve) rose from $58.5 billion to $88.1 billion, a 50.6 percent increase. As a result, real nonresidential fixed investment fell from a peak of 12.6 percent of real GM' at the end of 1985 to 11,1 percent in I/i 987. This decline as a share of rear GNP is the equivalent of about a $56.7 billion reduction, or 13.6 percent of investment spending, in I/l 987 alone, Canto (1988) also emphasizes the strong connection between changes in the exchange rate and tax rates, but only for personal tax rates! His explanation relies on an almost inconsequential reduction in personal tax rates in 1981 and has difficulty accounting for post-1984 exchange rate and investment developments. 'There are likely other factors that could account for the decline in the dollar's varue, but the hypothesis here, explained in Tatom (1987) , is that post-1984 policy developments reflect a reversal of earlier policies.
'The maximum marginal tax rate on personai and corporate income declined only slightly, from 60.8 percent in 1985 for 
An Increase in Supply Raises The Quantity Produced
When tines upplv of pm-ockrct X increases, its pm-rce will tennd to fail inn hotlu donunestic amnd fnnr'eignn (WI cur-r-enuc\' unnits to ituduce dornnestic arnd foreignn pun-n:inaser's to buy nnore of it, Tinus. given tine value of tine dollar' )F1, tine world price [ails to P,~annd pur-n:hases of product X rise, botin inn tine United States and abroad. Pr'oductionn r-ises onnly inn tine Unnited States, however, For-eigmn pm-odun:tionn of pr-oduct X falls because its price declimnes and tine for-eigmn supply curve n-ennnainns utncluanged. F'om'-eignuers would also conusume more of product X, so tines' would imncn-ease tineir-inupom-ts fr'onnn tine United States.' Sinnilariv, for a good tinat tine United States innnports, ann incm-ease inn tine U.S. stipplv of ann irnnpon'tn:onnnpetirng good will m-aise its world supply annd reduce its price. Just as for goods tinaf the tJnnited States expom-ts, tine pr-ice declinne will raise pumcinases at inonne arud ahr-oad. 'i'he donnnestic supply inncm'ease ennsures tinat domnnestic output n-ises, winile tine pn-in:e n'eductiomn ainroad will ennsnrn-e tinat production ahroad declirnes Vvinern tine supply of all pn-oducts inn a counntn-v clnarnges, tine anualysis is mnnor'e n:onnnpiex. For example, tine nnnomnetam-v appn-oach to the balance of paynnennts inndicates tlnat a general rise inn U.S. output will lower tine U.S. price level amnd raise tine ruonnninnal cxcluannge value of tine dollar-. tnn tinis appn-oacin, tine real exclnannge n-ate nneed nnot clnamnge, despite tine imncrease in domnnestic pr-nducuomn." Tinis appr-oan:in typically does nnot take innto accounut imnfernnatiomual capital rnnobility; tinus, it does rnot empinasize tIne innnpon-tarnce of capital tiows betweenn counutries as the pn-inncipal factor innfiuemncinng n-ccennt exclnatnge r-ate rnnovenneruts, irn additinnmn, r-eai innconnes will rnot r-ernnainn cornstamnt for such genuer-alized output changes. 'I'lne, ensuinng mise inn U.S. inconnne will also r-aise U.S. dennnannd for goods arnd services, 'line U.S. dernnanid curve 1) inn figur-e 2 will shift to tine niglut, tnnitigatinng htnt rnormnnally not offsettinng part of tine rise in tine excess supply shown tiner-e. More imnnpon-tatntlvĩ nowen'er-, tine supply and dennnarnd for pr-oduct X, or' pn-oducts genner-allv, will tend to fall abmoad, U.S. policy actionns tinat r'aise the real after-tax rate nnf return and shift donnestic supply n-igintward fionnn S to 5', also raise the cost of capital ainr-oad amud slnift tine foreignn srrpplv curve for-output leftwar-d, it'-dun:inng fon-eign output, incomnne annd demarnd. A decline in fon-eigrn irnconne reduces foreigrn demnnannd for gonnds and services, innciudirng tinose irnnported fr'onnn tine Unnited States.
Tine effects onu tr-ade flows an-c ambiguous winenn both snrpplv and demand cinannge. As ionng as tine dorTunatut domnnestic effect of polin:ies that m-aise (lowerl tine after--tax rate of neturn inn the United States is to raise (lower) tine U.S. snnppiv of traded goods output and lower (raise) foreign demnnand fom traded goods, the tr-ade finnvs predicted inn the connvenntiornai arualysis also am-c pr-edicted inn tine supply-side annalysis, That is, a rise (fail) in tine 'The productivity increase also explains why employment can decline despite the boost to output. Fieleke (1985) makes a similar argument about the relationship of net imports of an industry's product and employment in that industry. He provides evidence showing that net import movements were uncorrelated with industry employment, which is consistent with the argument below. McKenzie (1988) has shown that productivity advances, not imports, have been the maior factor behind employment losses in the textile industry. This view is explained more generally in Tatom (1986b) . 'Alternatively, given P in the analysis above, a decline in P due to an increase in domestic supply requires that 8 rise, Of course, the rise in the world supply of traded goods will reduce the world price of such a good measured in any currency. so that P must decline as well, Thus, the share of domestic producers in world production will rise because of increased domestic production and reduced foreign production. "A second approach based on the flow supply and demand for dollars, emphasizes the fall in import prices and quantities as a source of a reduced supply of dollars in international exchange and, under standard assumptions, a rise in nominat exports as a source of a rise in the demand for dollars in international exchange. The value of the dollar would rise for both reasons, although the malor factor affecting the exchange rate in either view is international capital flows. x Per Period value of the (1011am-will be associated witln a rise (fall) inn the quantity of irnnpor-ts arnd a fall )rise) in tine quarntitv of expor-ts. The centr-al dift'en-emnce, and tine focus men-c, is on~yhetinen-tine rise of U.S. imnnports and tine fall of exports wer-e indicator-s of a 'deindustm-ializing" ecornomnny or "inollowed" corporations, or instead wert' a synnptornn of a redistribution of capital, pn-oducti~ityand income toward tIne United States.
in tine snnppiy-side view, U.S. goods tinat formerly would inave been expon-ted an-c pun-cinased at honne arnd not ahm-oad when-c income reductions have n-educed demand; goods that fornnuerly wonnid inave been produced and consunned abroad face a larger demand in the United States and a snnaller demand abroad.' While these outconnes ar-c not inevitable for-every traded commodity, the analysis snrggests that the cornventional resuit -tinat domestic pr-oductionn of exponted and imported goods vai-ies inversely with the value of the dollar is a pantiai analysis less likely to hold if exchange rate movennents arise fi-om fon-ces that also change donnestic supply.
Figur-e 2 illustrates how donnestic output increases cann accompany an excinange n-ate appneciation. Increases in the supply of U.S. output generallx' will r-aise domestic output, reduce the U.S. price level and raise the nominal exchange rate. The result is a positive relationship between the exchange rate and output, contn-arv to the conventional relationship. Figurt' 2 also challennges the notion that a nise in the value of the dollar necessarily redistributes production, including that of U.S. export and impon-t-competing goods, away from the United States and toward our' foreign competitors. These implications am-c exannined below.' US. MANUFACTURING OUTPUT: A REVIEW OF SOME AGGREGATE EVIDENCE Tine key drffen-etnce betnveemn tine hvpotineses above corncer-nns tine n'eiatiornship betweern tine excinange i-ate annd donnestic output. tm tine cornyenntionnal view, this r-elationship is rnegati~'e;a supply-side per-spective ennpinasizes tinat it earn he positrn'e. 'l'he differemnce cennters orn winetiner cxclnannge rate clnannges art' exogenous or winetinertiney reflect charuges in domestic productivity annd output. One sonrrce of e~idenuceon tluis issue is tine slnan-e of donnestic nnannufactuning outpnmt inn U.S. pr-ecisely tine opposite should occur.' Thus, examining the perfornuances of tJ.S. nnanufactur-inng output n-dative to other major irndustrial countries is also relevant for distinguishing between these two explanations.
The Manu/hcturing Share of 115. Output
The actual anud cyclically adjtnsted sinar-es of manufacturirng output in n-cal GNP are sinonvn in cinart 2 for the period 1/1948 to 11/1988. The actual mannufactur-ing shane is an innpon-tant, but easily misinterpr-eted, sotnrce of evidence bearing on tine 'Krugman and Obstfeld (1988) explain how a transfer of income from the rest of the world to the United States causes the changes in demand and trade described here. They also explain that such a transfer raises the demand for U.S. goods relative to those produced abroad so that the terms of trade, the price of exports relative to imports, will rise. They apply their analysis to the recent flow of financial capital, instead of an increase in current and future U.S. income.
'The two theoretical approaches to exchange rate changes touch on a multitude of economic factors besides production, both at home and abroad, including purchases, relative prices, price levels, nominal and real trade flows. The qualitative predictions of the two theoretical analyses are the same for most of these factors under fairly standard assumptions. The critical difference involves production, and that is the focus here. " Tatom (1986a and shows that changes in the exchange rate occur two quarters earlier than their positively related changes in domestic manufacturing output. Exchange markets anticipate productivity improvements that follow decisions to change investment and capacity. Tatom (1986a) 
DIS/%GGRECATEI) EVIDENCE ON

PRODt~TION AND TRADE
If U.S. nnarnufactur-imng production was not depressed by the rise in the value of tine dollar'. wins' did the tr-ade deficit balloon fronn 1980 to 1985? Tine conventiornal explarnatiomu etnnphasizes tinat tine iise in tine value of tine dollar n'educed donnestic output, especially tine output of exported amnd irnnpor-t-connpetinng goods.'''ihe supply-side view, orn the otiner inannd, indicates tinat ann exparnded tn-ade deficit can accornnparnv relatively strong dornnestic output gn-owtiu if domnnestic productivity, output arnd irncomnne rise.". Tlnus, a detailed examnni-"The adjusted share is computed using the departure of the capacity utilization rate in manufacturing (which captures movements in manufacturing output common to all sectors and hence is a representative business cycle measure) from the 1948-88 average of 81.9 percent. A regression of the growth rate (change in the natural logarithm) of the share on a constant, lagged share and current and several lagged changes in the logarithm of the capacity utilization rate indicates that the lagged share and lags on the capacity utilization rate are not statistically significant at a conventional (5 percent) significance level. The equation estimated from rrrii 948 to 1/1988 has an insignificant intercept 0.02 percent (t = 0.37) and a coefficient of 0.61676 (t = 27.69) for the current change in the capacity utilization rate; the adjusted R' is 0.80 the standard error is 0.83 percent, and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.02. The estimate includes a significant first-order autocorrelation adjustment with p equal to 0.21 (t 2.66). Other methods that use changes in the unemployment rate or real GNP growth result in the same pattern for the adjusted share. "There are microeconomic arguments that emphasize other sources of reduced domestic output of imported and exported goods. See Arndt (1989) , Arndt and Bouton (1987) and Hooper and Mann (1989) , for example. "Wharton (1986) provides evidence supporting this view. Krugman and Baldwin (1987) , however, dismiss the importance of relative income growth in accounting for the emergence or elimination of the trade deficit, Their argument focuses on an asserted difficulty of raising U.S. export volumes, rt ignores the associated and currently more relevant problem (in the sense that export volume was restored to its 1980 record level as a share of real GNP in late 1987). This problem is the failure of U.S. export and import prices to rise relative to the prices of non-traded goods and services,
Chart 3
Manufacturing Production in the U.S. and Other OECD Countries nation of the industries nnost closely associated with the r-ecord trade deficit will allow us to assess whether' tineir' exper'iernce pn-ovides support for the rnnainstn'earnn view, despite its failure to expiain over-all manufacturing performance.
.Identjfving the Deficit Intl ustries
As the value of the dollar' rose fi-om 1980 to 1985, the L'S. mer'cinandise trade deficit also nose, clmnnhing fr'ornn 524.2 hilhomn to $132.5 bilhonn" 'i'inis rise was concentr'ated inn mnnarnufactur-irng, wluen'e an irnitial trade surphrs of $20.7 hillionn fell to a $104.3 billion deficit, Table 1 7 7 .
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'A"¼~4, million over the per'iod. Dnly six irndustries slnowed positive rnnovememnts in tineir' trade suntplus, atnd this group imncluded only omne of tine deficit-n-elated industries, pm'imnan' metals. Positive changes also wer-e r-econ'ded for chennnicals, tobacco, food, lunnhem-arnd pett-oleum. For' the other-four major-dcficit industries, tine total deficit rose $32.6 hilliorn; wlnemn primary metals ar-c imucluded, tine tr-ade dclicit of tine live pm'imncipal deficit-related irnclustm-ies rose $30.3 hilliomn, shigintls' more thann tIne 528.4 hilliorn inucrease inn tine total mnnanufactum-imug deficit. i'hus, tinese five industries accourmnt for' all of tine 1985-87 rise in tine nuamnufacturirug tr'ache deficit.
Coinpa rative Output Peijbrmance /1w the Deficit-Bela ted Industries
Tine top panel of table 2 sinows tine gr-owtiu nates iru marnufactun-irng output for tine five deficit-m-elated industr-ies and tine otlner 15 inndustries for-tIne period of the rising value of tine dollar-, tIne period of tine fallimng value of the dollar-, amnd tine ear-her' seven-year' period that is rourginls' a comnnpar-able cycle-peak-to-cycle-peak period for the United States. Over tinis ear-lien' period, tine value of the dollar declined sornnewhat chart Ir. 'l'he data inn the table show that tine five rleficit-relatech irndustries boomnmed durinug tine period of tine risirng dollar; itndeed. tines' were tIne sectors tluat pusined tIne overall rnnamnufacturr'irng gr'o~n'tinrate up to a 3.4 percemnt rate. Tine otiner 15 imndustries, as a group, sinowed mnnucln less acceleratiorn irn outpt.rt gr'owtln dynha gflq$ø it aod * ta~rf Wptsducw value of the dollar declined, hut in a direction olnposite to that pr-edicted by the mainstream view. Tine frrr'tiner' increase irn tine tr-ade deficit was associated witin a switctn to shower' domestic production gr-owtin, hotin over-all and in the five pm-mcipal industries." Manufactur'ing output gr-owth slowed sliglntly, led by a substantial slowing fin output gr-owtin inn the live deficit-related industr-ies." Tinis r-eductiomn un output gn-owth of the five deficit-r-elated industr-ies, botin absolutely and r-elative to tine otiner 15 industries, is inconsistent with the conventional vitew, but is consistent with the view that earlier incentives for' donnestic prodtnctivity gm-owth had been reduced.
The hottornn panel of table 2 shows labor' productivity gr'owtin, nneasured by the differ'ernce between output and employrnnemnt gn-owtin rates, for' tine five industries and othner manufacturing firms, 'h'he sharp acceleratiomn in pr-oductivitv in manuiäcturing in 1980-85, led by the five deficit-relaled irndustm'ies, clearly stands out, as does the r'elative decline for these same industries simnce 1985.
The evidence itn table 2 confirms and str-engtinens tine aggr-egate evidence, The aggm-egate data are rnot obscun-ing a negative reiationshnip between the value of the dollar-and output in tine deficit-related inndustmies. lmn fact, tine positive relationship is eyemn nnore appam-ernt for tine five irndustries,2 The resuits are str'ongI~at odds with the view that the exparnsiorn irn the trade deficit in 1980-85 came at the expemnse of donnestic pm-oduction. Instead, declinirng net expor-ts reflected irncn-eased domestic pur'-chases tinat outstmipped tine m-elatively rapid gm-owtin of dornnestic pm-oduction."
Moreover', as developnnemnts since 1985 suggest, tIne dechnimng dollar arnd tine nascennt rever-sal imn "The decline in output growth is much more pronounced when non-electric machinery is omitted from the live-industry and manufacturing measures. The growth rate for the four-industry total slowed from 2.6 percent in 1980-85 to zero in 1985-87, leading the decline in the growth rate of manufacturing which fell from a 2.3 percent to a 2.0 percent rate for the same periods. In 1973-80, the four-industry growth rate was 0.2 percent, and manufacturing less non-electric machinery grew at a 0.7 percent rate. '°Thecyclically adiusted output growth rate for the five deficitrelated industries rose 2.5 percentage points from 1973-80 to 1980-85; this increase is statistically significant, t = 2.47, according to a pooled t-test. The adhusted growth rate fell by a statistically significant 2.9 percentage points in 1985-87 from its 1980-85 rate (t -5.50). The cyclically adjusted growth rate is found using the regression of the actual growth rate of the five industries' output for the period 1967-80 on the real GNP growth rate. When the rate of change of the real exchange rate is regressed on the cyclically adjusted growth rate for 1967 to 1987. its coefficient is positive, 0.088, but not signiticantly so at conventional levels, I = 1.49.
"The 1981 tax act generally provided a subsidy to structures and to equipment that increased with its durability; these subsidies were reversed in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. If the five deficit-related industries are relatively more equipmentintensive in production, then their supply is relatively more affected by the changed taxation of capital income. Also, the rise in the real after-tax rate of return domestically will raise the cost of capital abroad, changing investment patterns so as to reduce foreign productivity growth relative to what it would otherwise have been, reinforcing the positive relationships abroad.
"When domestic industry price deflators are used to adjust nominal trade deficits, the resulting real net imports can be added to real output to obtain real domestic purchases. This procedure indicates a 9.4 percent annual rate of growth of real purchases in the five deficit-related industries from 1980 to 1985 and a slowing to a 6.7 percent rate from 1985 to 1987. Th fhtse'-mndustry group rmriksdes IectrrS qulpmnent tromng et nc nin oinmery arid tratmsportatnor-m e4thpntotnt t foot~uat~gr*tipaddhe prImary meals aduefry frye-ndu$y~groRaddaother nonrluraib.h4 Ot at norndutthles noiSes appara apd other textleprodunts', tobacco p odtrcts p rttmng ad ptrbltstnm ad liner p bdtrcts SOURCE Comptrtth f omda puSh edbytheFederat Rase e~oa. C tine trade deficit look to be tine m'esults of policy actions that Inave reversed tine ear-her productivity boomnn inn tinese key undustm-ies. Thnus, by m-educirng tineir cornnpetitivemness intem-nnationally, these policy actiomns inave allowed weaker-sector-s irn tine Limited States arnd abroad to exparnd. Orn nnet, tlnese cinanges will reallocate wor-Id comnsummnptiomn annd production awas' from tine Umnitedl States.
Were Current Production Changes at Odds with. Longer-Term Output Plans?
As noted earlier-, mnnamnufactun-ing output is stm-omnghv imnfluenced by cyclical factor-s. Orne way to avoid tine imnfiuemnce of such tennpor-amy factor's at tIne umndustry level is to exannine capacity output measures.'l'he long-run choices of capacity and its optinnal output ar-c based omn expected prices and costs. The capacity cinoice is more forwam-dlooking and is based on more pernnanent comnsideratiomns than the cur-rent output choice. If a r-ise imn tine value of the dollar will redtnce tine optimnal domestic output of ann industry, tlnern, regar-dless of current output developments, firms will cut back orn the gm-owth of capacity,T able 3 shows the gm-owth rates for' manufactur--ing capacity and sever-al industry groupings of tIne pr-incipal deficit-rehated industries over tIne sanne periods as imn table 2. Winile the growth of mamnirfactum-irng capacity slowed inn 1980-85, tinenn slowed fiurtiner imn 1985-87, two of tIne three rnneasures of capacits' gr-owtln irn deficit-m'elatcd imndustr-ies accehcrated imn 1980-85, tinemn slowed irn 1985-87 ." Tinis is pm-ecisely tIne sarnne patter-mn followed by actual output inn table 2. 'i'he exception is tine four--irndustrv mnneasure, wlner'e tine decline imn pr'imnnamy mnnetals capacity gr-owtin meld the gr-oup's mate to tIne sammne pace irn 1980-85 as imn 1973-80.
Whemn tIne dollar' was r-isimng, capacity gm-owtlu irn the deficit-related industries, by all tinm-ee measures, exceeded tine over-all aver-age for nnamnufacturing capacity growth amnd accelen-ated r-elative to the aver-age for nnanufactur-imng. Thus, tIne sluar-e of mnnamnufacturing capacity imn tlnese industries was exparnding and expamndimng faster-tlnamn it mad cam'-her-, For-the five-industry rnneasur'e, capacity gr-owth was shiglntlv below tine over-all manufactum--ing growtin rate in 1973-80, hut it jurnnped to ahout a 24 percemnt faster gr-owth r-ate tinan in nnamnufacttrming irn 1980-85. Whemn the dollar fell fionn 1985-87, tinese developnnents were r-cven-sed. 't'he capacity growth r-ates fin the deficit-related industries declined and wen-e shower than for mannufactur-ing as a whole, Tine sinai-c of capacity in the deficit-m-elated imndustries began to decline sligintly. This r-esuht is imncornsisternt witin tine view tinat inter-national competitiveness imn tinese irndurstr-ies had impr-oved since 1985.
"The Federal Reserve Board compiles data on industrial capacity for the sectors in table 1, except that apparel products are lumped into "other nondurable manufacturing" which also includes tobacco products, printing and publishing, and leather and products. 
CQNCLUSIO.N
Tine nnaitnstreamnn view tlnat tine dollam"s declimne inas innnpm-o\'ed U.S. connpetitiverness is based otn a par-tial amnd mnnisleading econnornnic amnalysis. Tinis vnew mnnistakeniy focuses on the effects of exogemnous exclnange rate nnovennemnts on tmade and output. hmn a broader' amnalysis, the exclnamnge rate is dleten'mnnined precisely by tlnose factor's that drive economic connpetitmverness. linus, a rise in tIne value of the dollar-can n-eflect ann innnpm-ovememnt in connpetitivemness, ratlner-tlnan a cause of its decline. Simnnilam'iy, a fall in the dollar-s value can mefiect a dleclimne imn comirpetitivemness; it is not necessam-il~'a factor tinat will innpr-ove it, Wlnile tinere ar-c fimmnns and evemn imndustm-ies witlnimn the gr-oups exannirned hem-c -'-for-exannple, the pm-imary metals sector--in which relative pr-oductivitv changes have not beemn signnificamnt so that amn imnverse m-elationsinip between the dollar exchange mate and production amnd emplo~nnentis observed, tlney am-c not typical. For-tine U.S. nnamnufactur-inng sector as a winole and the industries most closely connected to tine U.S. trade deficit, tine reiationship between movements in tine value of the dollar' and output gr-owth during tlnis decade inas been a positive one.
irn the early 1980s, U.S. manufactur-ing output, especially when adjusted for' the effect of the U.S. busirness cycle, was umnusually stm-ong m'elative to both its owmn past exper'ience and output growth ahroad. The industries most closely related to a 8125 billion surge in the nnanufactur ng trade deficit were the leading sector-s in this strong gm-owth; tlnese industries showed a sham-p acceleration in capacits' gr-owtmn over tine sanne period that teinforced their-gm-owing donninance imn ecomnomic pen'-fom-mnnamnce.
From 1985 to 1987, tinese ti-ends, like the value of the dollam, meversed, Only the tn-ade deficit contintmed its pm-evious patter-mn, gm-owing somewhat ham-ger over' tine period. and this incmease was hilly accoumnted fom' by tine samnne key industm'ies. O"er tine period, tine slnar-e of mnnamnufacturing output imn U.S. pI-odluctiomn, on a cyclically-adjusted basis, did not increase, Meanwhile, actual marnufactumirng output gr-owth abroad accelen'ated both absolutely and relative to its cotnmnter-par-t in tine United States. Inn tine Umnited States, at least, tlnis pattermn was domimnatedl by tIne siowimng of output gr-ovn'thn imn tine key deficit-r-elated irndustr-ies, Fmonn 1985 to 1987, capacitv gm-owth slowed in the deficit-r-elated irndustm'ies to a pace below tlnat for-nnanufacturing.
A cerntral lcssomn of this evidence is that tine effects of cinamnges irn tine dollar exclnarnge rate omn domnestic production, at least during the i980s, am-c dornnirnated by tine efl'ccts of the econonnic policy changes tlnat also inave pm-oduced tIne exchange rate nnovernnents, The evidernce suggests tlnat the increased U.S. manufactuming connpetitiveness pr-oduced by economic policy changes in the eamly 1980s inas been i-educed by m-ever-sals of some of these policies inn tIne mid-1980s.
